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Several remarkable things have happened in New York's crime and crime policy over the past 20 years. Some of these changes have been very visible, and others less so.
As in the rest of the country, crime and violence in the state plummeted dramatically. New York City reported the largest decline in crime. Meanwhile, the New York Police Department shifted its policing practices beginning in the 1990s, starting with the implementation of "broken windows" policing and morphing into the now infamous "stop-and-frisk" practices. These practices focus law enforcement resources on petty crimes or violations.
During this same time period, the entire incarcerated and correctional population of the City -the number of people in jails and prisons, and on probation and parole -dropped markedly. New York City sending fewer people into the justice system reduced mass incarceration in the entire state. This change was much less publicly noticed but just as noteworthy as the other two shifts. Though other states have decreased their prison populations, New York is the first state documented to have decreased its entire correctional population.
Are there connections between these three shifts -a decrease in crime, a decrease in the correctional population, and a sharp increase in controversial police practices? What factors contributed to these shifts? What about the costs of these shifts? Have they been evaluated and weighed against the benefits?
In this report, leading criminologists James Austin and Michael Jacobson take an empirical look at these powerful social changes and any interconnections. Examining data from 1985 to 2009, they conclude that New York City's "broken windows" policy did something unexpected: it reduced the entire correctional population of the state. As the NYPD focused on low-level arrests, it devoted fewer resources to felony arrests. At the same time, a lowered crime rate -as an additional factor -meant that fewer people were committing felonies.
This combination led to fewer felony arrests and therefore fewer people entering the correctional system. Other policieslike programs that stopped punishing people with prison if not necessary -also contributed to this population drop. New York's drop in the correctional population was almost derailed in 1994 when the federal government paid states to create laws increasing prison sentences. Congress used the power of the purse to pull states in this direction in spite of evidence showing that increased prison time does not decrease crime or recidivism. The drop in New York's corrections population would have occurred more quickly had the state not enacted such laws and increased prison stays.
This report poses a host of difficult questions for those who defend "broken windows" policing as well as those who find fault with it. Though the New York strategy identified by Austin and Jacobson has benefits, it also has costs. Focusing police resources on petty crimes, predominantly in neighborhoods of color, creates a host of economic and social costs for those arrested and their families. At the same time, this move actually contributed to a decrease in mass incarceration.
The data in this report tells us a lot, but there are still questions. The increase in low-level arrests did not bring down the correctional population; rather, the decrease in felony arrests did. Had the number of misdemeanor arrests decreased, the correctional population would have declined more steeply. To what extent New York City's policing strategy contributed to the drop in the crime rate is a complex question unanswered by the data in this report.
This report also does not evaluate the NYPD's "stop-and-frisk" policy. It analyzes data in years before this practice became systemic. It also does not analyze the effects of the reforms to the notorious Rockefeller drug laws, since those reforms were enacted after the documented drop in correctional population.
Austin and Jacobson's study comes at a critical juncture, when the United States is starting to reconsider its crime policy. With 2.3 million people behind bars and more than 25 percent of the country with criminal records, mass incarceration has become a national epidemic. 1 Half of the people in state prisons are there for nonviolent offenses; half the people in federal prisons are there for drug offenses. 2 At least 30 percent of new prison admissions are for violations of parole; and more than 20 percent of those incarcerated have not been convicted and are simply awaiting trial. 3 In a policy area historically marked by rancor and recrimination, Austin and Jacobson offer something vital to lawmakers and advocates: facts. As state and federal governments begin to discuss how to reduce their incarcerated populations, this report offers empirical data to evaluate one model for change. The New York experience provides some vital lessons:
> Theories abound about why the national crime rate dropped, but the New York experience shows that mass incarceration is not necessary to decrease crime.
> Police practices have a monumental impact on mass incarceration. The police are almost always the first point of contact between an individual and the criminal justice system.
> Ending mass incarceration entails more than simply reducing prison populations. It requires reducing the entire correctional population -meaning the number of people arrested, in jails awaiting trial, in prisons serving sentences, and on probation and parole.
> Federal, state, and local policies can work together -or against each other -to create a drop in corrections populations. Federal funding streams can be a key mechanism affecting the size of state correctional systems.
> All criminal justice policies have costs and benefits that should be fully identified and weighed before implementation. This practice would be a marked shift from typical policymaking.
We hope this report will help lawmakers and advocates develop rational and effective criminal justice policies that keep Americans safe while shrinking the widening net of mass incarceration. delAyed eFFeCt on budget worth more misdemeanor arrests. There also may be ways to implement police practices that do not increase misdemeanor rates. States that seek to reduce mass incarceration should embrace a balanced, data-driven policy selection process that involves both state and local action.
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I. Decline in New York Prison Population
All correctional populations are the result of two key factors -admissions and length of stay (LOS). A jurisdiction's correctional population is the function of the following formula:
(Admissions x Length of stAy) = CorreCtionAL PoPuLAtion.
As either or both of these two population drivers change, so too will the resulting correctional population. While this is a straight-forward formula, it masks the various factors and decisions that produce an admission or a LOS. In order to propose reforms that would lower correctional populations, it is important to understand these various factors and dynamics that have fueled the historic increases in population.
Like most states, New York's prison population began to increase steadily beginning in the 1970s. However, New York reached its peak in 2000 with about 71,500 people and has since declined by 17 percent to 59,000 people in 2009.
Conversely, the national state prisoner population has continued to increase at a steady but gradually declining rate 1,400,000 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
A. droP in new york City Admissions
Nationally, parole violations and new commitments are two of the most common categories for people admitted to the prison system. A new commitment is an individual who was not under parole supervision at the time he or she was convicted of a new crime. A sizeable portion of new commitments, however, include people who were under probation supervision at the time they either were convicted of a new felony or violated the terms of supervision. People who violate probation or parole supervision can account for more than half of total prison admissions.
As shown in Figure 2 , the number of new commitments began to decline in 1992, eight years before the prison population began to decline. Since 1992, the number of new court commitments declined by 36 percent from 25,000 to 16,000 per year. 30,000 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
b. inCreAse in stAtewide length oF stAy
Why did the prison population continue to increase for eight years before it began to decline? In New York, it was due to a steady increase in the LOS. As shown in Figure 3 , the LOS steadily increased beginning after 1990, when it averaged 28 months. A partial explanation for this increase is a greater proportion of people entering prison convicted of violent crimes while the number of people convicted of non-violent crimes (especially drug crimes) has declined (see Figure 4) . But even for those convicted of violent crimes, the LOS has steadily increased (see Table 1 ). This increase in the LOS is largely due to New York state enacting a number of "truth-in-sentencing" laws since 1995 that require people convicted of certain violent crimes to serve six-sevenths (approximately 85 percent) of their imposed sentences. Prior to 1995, all prisoners were sentenced under an indeterminate sentencing structure. 6 The state also added burglary in the 1st and 2nd degree -which typically involve burglary in an occupied building -to the violent crime category, increasing the LOS for those crimes too.
This move to increase the LOS was driven in part by a 1994 federal law titled the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act. This law, signed by President Clinton, provided more than $9 billion in prison construction funds to states that would increase the LOS to 85 percent of the imposed sentence for people convicted of violent crimes. The types of crimes for which people were sentenced to prison also helps explain the overall increase in the LOS. Figure 4 shows that prison admissions for drug crimes dropped the most since 1992 compared to other crimes. Although admissions declined for violent crimes (from 8,600 in 1992 to about 5,000 in 2008), drug crime admissions dropped as well, from 11,250
to about 5,000 over that same period, a 55 percent decrease. Conversely property crime admissions steadily increased.
From 1999 to 2008, the LOS for violent felony offenses increased by 17 months, whereas the LOS for other crime categories remained relatively stable (see Table 1 ). Therefore, substantial increases in the LOS for violent offenses outweighed the decline in admissions for these crimes. The increase in overall LOS was largely due to increases in the LOS for violent crimes. 12,000 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 In sum, despite the trend toward longer sentences for violent crimes, the prison population began to fall because fewer people entered prison for drug offenses. The vast majority of reductions in admissions for drug offenses occurred in New York City (Figure 5) . Most of the decline in the state prison population was due to declines in drug admissions and, in particular, declines in admissions from New York City. 
II. Decline in New York Parole, Probation, and Jail Populations
The same differential growth and decline between New York City and the rest of the state also occurred for probation, jail, and parole populations. Figure 7 shows the historic growth patterns for the probation system for New York City and the rest of the state. The state probation population declined significantly beginning in 1998, from 150,000 to 122,000
people by 2008, a 19 percent decrease. Like the decline in the state prison population, this reduction was limited to people sentenced to probation in New York City, which saw its probation population decline from 77,000 to 44,000 over this period. During the same time period, the probation population outside of New York City remained stable. 180,000 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 25,000 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
III. Delayed Effect on State Corrections Budget
Despite the falling prison population, the annual operating budget of the New York DOCCS increased from $1.6 billion in FY98-99 to $2.5 billion by FY06-07 ( Table 2 ). The overall corrections budget, which includes other related costs, increased from about $2.2 billion to $3 billion. The largest increases were in support, security, and health services (from $1.3 billion to $2.2 billion per year). Despite the declining prison population, correctional staffing levels remained relatively steady. By 2005 New York had one of the lowest staff to inmate ratios in the nation ( Table 3) . The number and rate of inmate assaults on staff and other inmates has dropped significantly since 1985. 10 While this decline in assaults predates the decline in the prison population, it does appear that the reduced prison population has contributed to a much safer prison system for prisoners and staff. 
IV. Accompanying Drop in New York City's Crime Rate and Shift in Arrest Policy
During the same period that New York City's correctional populations dramatically declined, the crime rate also declined.
Beginning in 1990, the number of serious crimes reported to police in New York City began to fall dramatically, as it also did in other major U.S. cities. In 1988, there were approximately 720,000 FBI Unified Crime Report Index (UCR) crimes. Several factors contributed to this significant decline, including changes in demographics, declining birth rates, economic conditions (including high employment), and reduction in illicit drug markets, as well as a shift to more effective policing practices. As shown in Table 4 , New York City, compared to the United States as a whole, had significantly lower rates of crime and correctional supervision by 2008. The rates of jail and probation supervision in New York City are extremely low compared to national rates. The state prison rate for New York City would be even lower had the state not increased the LOS, which is now one of the nation's highest. But one should not conclude that reductions in the crime rate produced the drop in the correctional population. New
York state jurisdictions outside New York City experienced a 38 percent drop in crime, without reducing the number of people sentenced to state and local correctional systems. Furthermore, the other 49 states and the District of Columbia have also reported significant reductions in their crime rates, some as much as New York City, but have not reduced their correctional populations. 13 One key difference between New York City and other jurisdictions is evident in arrest data. As shown in Figure 11 , while overall arrests increased slightly since 1985, there was a major shift from felony to misdemeanor arrests. In the early 1990s, the NYPD began to slowly but steadily decrease the number of felony arrests and simultaneously increase the number of misdemeanor arrests. By 2008, felony arrests had significantly declined while misdemeanor arrests had significantly increased. The reduction in felony arrests coincides with the drop in prison admissions noted earlier (see 350,000 400,000 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 250,000 300,000 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Arrests for misdemeanor drug crimes in New York City increased more than arrests for other misdemeanor crimes ( Figure 13) . Further, felony drug arrests dropped significantly since 1986 while misdemeanor drugs arrests in New York City more than doubled (Figure 14) . 120,000 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 120,000 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 The reduction in felony arrests should not be viewed as a decision by the NYPD to ignore serious crime. Rather, it reflects a shift in police strategies to focus on so-called "quality of life", "zero tolerance", or "broken windows" police strategies.
14 These policies focus law enforcement resources on misdemeanor crimes such as loitering, trespassing, and vagrancy.
Notably, these changes in NYPD practices post-date the beginning of the crime rate decline.
More recently, NYPD's police practices have been the subject of considerable controversy due to reports of a steady increase in the number of people arrested for misdemeanor drug possession (especially marijuana) who are black or Hispanic. 15 To illustrate this most current trend, the number of Hispanic and black arrestees in New York City has increased significantly since 2002, most sharply for black arrestees. Arrests of white individuals and other ethnic groups have also increased, but not as sharply (Figure 15) . Notably, the surge in stop-and-frisk as a policy practice occurred from the mid to late 2000s -after the drop in correctional population noted in this report. 200,000 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 The dramatic drop in the New York City jail population reinforces the perspective that changes in the NYPD's arrest practices were central to the drop in the New York City correctional populations. As noted earlier (Figure 9) , the New York City jail population peaked at 21,448 in 1991. By 2009, the jail population had declined a staggering 38 percent to 13,362.
Remarkably, this occurred while the total number of arrests increased. Total jail admissions also declined, especially for felony level charges (Figure 16 ). The number of misdemeanor and "other" related jail admissions increased, but these increases did not outweigh the large decline in felony jail admissions. Ironically, there were no changes in the LOS for people admitted and released from New York City jails (Figure 17) . In summary, the reduction in felony arrests by the NYPD explains why all forms of correctional supervision dropped.
Fewer people arrested for felonies led to fewer people in prison, and on probation or parole. Even though the volume of arrests actually increased, courts are less able to sentence people to prison, keep them in jail on pretrial detention status, or sentence them to probation. This lowering of the prison, jail, probation, and parole populations of the city brought down the correctional population of the entire state.
Also, there was a sharp decline in the prison disposition rate within New York City. As shown in New York City has a wide array of alternatives to incarceration programs funded by New York State, New York City, and local foundations aimed at reducing the prison disposition rate. These programs are operated by the following entities: Such a vibrant and mature array of alternative programs does not exist outside of New York City, which may explain why the prison disposition rate for non-New York City counties did not decline, but actually increased slightly from 17 percent to 18 percent over the same period. The percentage of felony arrests resulting in a "conditional discharge" has not increased in these other jurisdictions.
Much of the decline in the correctional population is linked directly to a decline in the number of people arrested for felony level crimes. This decline in felony arrests was due, in large part, to changes in police practices carried out by the New York Police Department beginning in the early 1990s.
Conclusion
The declines in New York State's prison population as well as the New York City jail population are due largely to a reduction in the number of people being arrested for felony level crimes. Greater use of non-prison sanctions by New York City courts also contributed to the decline. The New York City and overall New York prison population decline would have occurred much sooner had the state legislature not been incentivized by the federal government to adopt "truth-in-sentencing" laws that increased the length of imprisonment.
These results show that policy changes at the local level can have a dramatic and lasting impact on state prison as well as jail, probation, and parole populations. Further, the decline in the state prison population was not initially associated with a decline in prison costs. In fact, the state prison budget increased significantly while the prison population declined. Only in recent years has the DOCCS budget stabilized, and prisons begun to close.
The New York experience has two important lessons for efforts to reduce the national epidemic use of mass incarceration. First, changes in policy at the local level (especially police policy) can have a dramatic impact on all forms of correctional supervision and imprisonment. Thus, efforts that only focus on reform at the state level of government are incomplete and may not be as effective as those coupled with locally initiated reforms. Second, both incarceration and crime rates can be reduced. Thus, the argument that lowering prison and jail populations will necessarily trigger increases in crime rates are patently false.
